

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

20 February 1953

Kibitz 15

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT : Memorandum for the record concerning disposition
of the KIBITZ-15 net.

1. In the discussion of 14 February 1953 concerning the KIBITZ project carried on by [], [], [], [], [], [] and [], [] wishes to present the following as a minority report reflecting his own convictions and which follows the spirit of his Washington briefing on this subject.
2. The KIBITZ-15 net should be completely dissolved. This is a very bad clandestine operation and it violates almost all of the rules of good tradecraft. It is badly compartmented. The physical security is poor, and the stayability of it's members is of a very low order. Also this net has been in operation for over two and one-half years carrying out operations in a loose manner and, I believe, that in many ways the length of time it has been in existence stands as a factor against it's continuation. The last year has seen a gradual tightening up of all phases of the net's security, however, security breaches, such as are inherent in this organization, are not ones that can be rectified after their commission.
3. The writer does not make the above recommendation lightly as he has been associated with this operation for the past two and one-half years in various capacities. He feels that as long as this operation is allowed to continue, the net's faults will compound themselves and so much of the time of available staff personnel will be absorbed in it's running, that a good, solid, well motivated, secure staybehind operation will never be effectively mounted.
4. In regard to referenced dispatch Para. 2 (B) and (C), the writer feels that these actions are justified only if it is felt that there may be an almost immediate need for a staybehind net. Otherwise, the energies of the present staff could be better utilized in recruiting and organizing a new staybehind program.
5. Para. 4 appears to the writer as contemplating having KIBITZ-15, to some degree at least, connected with two completely different intelligence operations at the same time. This [] is completely against. In view of our past difficulties in the handling and running of KIBITZ-15 in one operation, it seems we are now compounding our past difficulties.
6. All objections to KIBITZ-15 have been covered many times before and there is no need to enumerate them further, but they should be kept in mind during the making of any decision concerned with keeping KIBITZ-15 in his present capacity or starting him in a new one.
7. I wish to make it clear that whatever the final decision is in this matter, that decision will be implemented by me to the best of my ability.

DIST:
2 - FHB

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